quam humanae, ne igitur tenebris ignorantiae mens avida, conclusa mole carnis, profundius obfuscetur, sub quarum velamine famosarum maxime quaestionum veritas lateat non investigata, quae per locorum spatia diffuse distenditur amplissima, licet nobis parumper de ipsa disserere, ut ipsius habeatur memoriale.
The text ends with a complete sentence-"Unde licet opposita intelliguntur insimul ab intelligente, non tamen oportet quod sint simul in se extra in re"-though there is no resounding conclusion. A different, much later, hand has continued the text in mid-column, with the words, "Item, sequitur." Whether that sentence is meant to link our commentary to what is now the next column on the next quire is by no means clear, but it seems unlikely that the two texts belong together. The quires on which the commentary appears are unnumbered. The first is complete (eight folios). The second was intended to be only half the usual length (four folios), which indicates that the scribe planned to complete the work about where it now ends. Since the last quire is missing its last leaf, however, we do not know whether the work is complete. It may be incomplete, but if so, little has been lost. Like Rufus's other early commentaries, the Memoriale is principally comprised of brief questions based on the Aristotelian text or on Averroes' commentary. So brief are most of these questions that only three of the eleven books are more than one folio long. By far the longest is the commentary on its last book, book Lambda.
Transcribed in the fall of 1996 from Erfurt Q 290 f.46ra-55vb, the first reason to attribute this work to Rufus was its presence in the Ave Maria Aristotle quires (Erfurt Q290 and Q312), 3 which contain other works by Rufus. Once it was clear that it was a Metaphysics commentary, there was a further reason for the attribution: We know that Rufus wrote two Metaphysics commentaries. In his Dissertatio in Metaph., he refers to a previous Physics commentary, 4 Clearly, the author of the Memoriale does discuss "caused things" in abstraction from particular caused things. So we looked for further evidence that might confirm or disconfirm the attribution-namely, for similarities and dissimilarities with known works by Rufus.
COMPARISON WITH RUFUS'S DISSERTATIO IN METAPH. COMMENTARY
The obvious place to start was with Rufus's principal Metaphysics commentary, his Dissertatio in Metaph. (Diss.). The two commentaries are divided into the same eleven books, ending with Lambda, and lacking Kappa; the same translation is employed-the "nova" by Michael Scot which accompanies Averroes. Aristotle is repeatedly named, but seldom referred to as "the Philosopher": indeed, one reference in the early commentary to the "Philosopher" turns out to be a citation of Boethius (VII Q290.49vb). Only twice cited by name, as "Aweroys" or "Averoys," Averroes is commonly called "the Commentator." In discussing Saturn, both commentaries refer to the Greek astronomers Eudoxus and Callippus as "Oditius" and "Kilonius" (Q.290 39ra and 54ra). 5 The statements of purpose with which the works begin employ an unusual turn of phrase "parumper disserere de"-a similarity that is shared with a third work: Similarly characteristic is Rufus's defense of Plato's views on universals against Aristotle. An important element of this defense is the claim that Aristotle misinterpreted Plato by mistakenly ascribing to him the view that universals existed separately not only without matter, but apart from any soul. Rufus understands Plato to hold only the view that forms can exist as ideas without being individually instantiated in matter, distinct from sensible objects: Rufus says that Aristotle "imposed on Plato" the doctrine of separated forms apart from the soul. According to Rufus, this distortion enabled Aristotle to employ the so-called "third man" argument against Plato, an infinite regress argument which claims that Plato is committed to positing forms of forms: Not Aristotle but Plato understood universals correctly according to Rufus. Properly speaking, the term 'universal' refers to ideas in the mind; it refers only secondarily to the kind of form which combines with matter. The disagreement between Aristotle and Plato on universals, Rufus attributes to ambiguity in the use of the term 'universal'. Plato employs it properly to refer to forms in the intellect or ideas; less properly Aristotle refers to forms which exist outside the mind. 6 The difference between the two philosophers is succinctly stated in a discussion of ideas, written after the Memoriale and before the Dissertatio, the first question in Rufus's Contra Averroem. 
COMPARISON WITH "DE INTELLECTU DIVINO"
In the course of comparing the two Metaphysics commentaries, we have already seen similarities with a number of other works-chiefly, with the intermediate Contra Averroem. Although we cannot make comparisons with every other work, we must consider one other work: Rufus's "De intellectu divino" (IDiv). Though it is a minor work, like the Dissertatio, it is explicitly ascribed to Rufus by a thirteenth-century hand in the manuscript where it is preserved, Assisi Bibl. Com. 138. 7 Since it is so short, there are comparatively few 7. Doucet, V., Prolegomena, in Summa Halesiana IV p.1, Quaracchi 1948, Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, p. 141. points of comparison, but three similarities in doctrine can be adduced. First, both works teach that the First Cause knows everything by knowing itself. Contrary to the opinion Rufus was to defend later, 8 they follow Averroes and deny that the First Cause knows others, and they argue for that position by pointing to the dissimilarities between our knowledge and that of the First Cause: We know passively and by reception; not so, the First Cause.
IDiv: Ad ista potest probabiliter responderi quod istud nobile primum nihil extra se intelligendo, se intelligens omnia verissime intelligit. Et hoc, ut dicunt quidam, intelligit Aristoteles probare in prima parte illius capituli, Scientia autem patrum (12.8.1074b13). Nec addit forte secundum rem hic quod intelligit omnia et quod se intelligit. . . . Ideo addendum [est] quod ipse intelligit non per receptionem, quia nullius speciem vel formam recipit, cum non sit receptivum, cum omne receptivum sit in potentia. Nec se ipsum intelligit recipiendo, cum sit ipse actus purus . . . diversificet suam cognitionem a nostra, scilicet cognoscere non per receptionem. (A138.262vb) Mem. XI: Aliter dicitur sic: quod Primum tantum intelligit se ipsum, et tamen intelligendo se ipsum intelligit omnia, quia in ipso relucent omnia sicut in speculo.
Ratio Aristotelis quae probat quod Primum non intelligit alia a se per receptionem est ista: si intelligeret alia a se, perficeretur per per ea-quod est inconveniens. Sic enim intelligit intellectus noster, scilicet per receptionem, et ideo per recepta perficitur. Non contingit autem de intellectu Primi, quia non intelligit per receptionem sed per se ipsum. (Q290.54vb-55ra)
Another fairly common position defended in both works is that the Cause knows by privation, since privation is not to be posited in the First Cause. So we say instead that in so far as matter is privation, it is known by knowing the corresponding habit. The two works suggest the same strategy: understanding an absence by knowing something present. But the second shows more theological sophistication.
Rufus on enuntiables presents a similar case. The doctrine is similar: In "De intellectu divino," Rufus holds that enuntiables about God are true from eternity, but since they are relations that have no existence apart from their extremes, we need not posit more than one eternal being. In commenting on the Metaphysics, however, Rufus defends a more general conclusion to cover other eternal truths-for example, that triangles have three sides: From the fact that many enuntiables are true from eternity, it does not follow that there are a plurality of beings, since God's knowledge does not depend on beings.
IDiv: Item, qualiter enuntiabilia sint ab aeterno, ut Deum-esse et Deum-esse-esse-verum. Videtur mihi quod enuntiabilia non dicit aliquid sed solummodo relationem extremorum. Unde Deum-esse non est alia essentia a Deo. (A138.262vb) Mem. XI: Dicendum quod non sunt plura ab aeterno, et tamen sunt plura enuntiabilia ab aeterno vera. Nec tenet hoc argumentum: enuntiabilia plura sunt vera ab aeterno, ergo sunt ab aeterno. (Q290.48rb)
We know that Rufus did not abandon the position on relations held in "De intellectu divino." As Gedeon Gál pointed out, in his last known work, the Paris Commentary, 9 Rufus held that relations do not signify anything apart from the relata. Still the IDiv position does not explain why truths unrelated to God do not require that we posit eternal beings other than God. Perhaps that is why he revised his view. At any rate, in the later Dissertatio, Rufus adopts the position of the Memoriale, which he repeats word for word:
Mem. VII: Dicendum quod non sunt plura ab aeterno, et tamen sunt plura enuntiabilia ab aeterno vera. Nec tenet hoc argumentum: enuntiabilia plura sunt vera ab aeterno, ergo sunt ab aeterno.
Ad argumentum in oppositum dicendum quod verum quoddam cadit in cognitione nostra, et illud verum cadit sub ente et ad ipsum sequitur. Et si accipiatur hoc modo verum, non est haec propositio vera: 'Enuntiabilia sunt ab aeterno vera'. Est autem aliud verum quod cadit in cognitione primae causae, et istud verum non est sub ente, nec ad illud verum sequitur ens, et illo modo veri sunt enuntiabilia vera ab aeterno, nec ex hoc sequitur quod sint ab aeterno. (Q290.48rb) 9. Gál, G. "Opiniones Richardi Rufi a censore reprobatae," Franciscan Studies 35 (1975):136-93.
Diss. VII:
Ad aliud dicendum quod non sunt plura ab aeterno, et tamen sunt plura enuntiabilia vera ab aeterno. Nec tenet hoc argumentum: enuntiabilia sunt vera ab aeterno, ergo sunt ab aeterno.
Ad argumentum in oppositum, dicendum quod verum quoddam cadit in cognitione nostra, et illud verum cadit sub ente, et ad ipsum sequitur ens. Et si accipitur hoc modo 'verum', non est haec propositio vera: Enuntiabilia sunt vera ab aeterno. Est autem aliud verum quod cadit in cognitione primae causae, et illud verum non est sub ente nec ad illud verum sequitur ens, et illo modo sunt enuntiabilia vera ab aeterno, nec ex hoc sequitur quod sint ab aeterno. (Vat. lat. 4538.51rb-va)
ATTRIBUTION TO RICHARD RUFUS
While more similarities could be adduced, these should suffice. The evidence for the authenticity of the early Metaphysics commentary is overwhelming: It appears in a Rufus manuscript. It contains passages that are repeated word for word in a work explicitly ascribed to Rufus in the thirteenth century, Rufus's Dissertatio in Metaphysicam Aristotelis. It defends many of the views Rufus held, including several defended by no other author as far as we know. Moreover, it shares important stylistic similarities with other works by Rufus.
DATING
Having established the attribution of the early Metaphysics commentary to Rufus, we should say a little more about its date. The most important result of the foregoing discussion in that regard comes from the comparison with "De intellectu divino." Both the greater sophistication of the early Metaphysics commentary and its closer resemblance to the Dissertatio suggests that it was not Rufus's first work. The magistral question, "De intellectu divino" preceded it. And as we knew at the outset, the Physics Commentary came later. So we know something about the relative chronology. The order is: "De intellectu divino," Memoriale, "In Physicam Aristot.," Dissertatio.
The absolute chronology is more elusive, however. The main dating tool we have is Rufus's quotation of the Dissertatio in Metaph. Aristot. as the work of a secular author, meaning it is a work produced before the spring of 1238, when Rufus became a Franciscan. So the date of the Dissertatio is probably around 1237. If we allow a couple years for other works, we may suppose that the Memoriale was not produced before 1235. If we also assume that Rufus did not follow the example of the Parisian masters who began teaching the libri naturales in 1231 before the commission to expurgate
